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Abstract
This paper presents necessary and suﬃcient conditions for unambiguous
changes in wage inequality in a dual economy, based on analysis of the entire
Lorenz curve. These conditions are then used to analyze the distributional
consequences of various types of economic growth. In particular, it is shown
that capital accumulation or technical progress in agriculture is likely to
reduce wage inequality, but the eﬀects of development in non-agriculture
are typically ambiguous. The paper also discusses the implications of this
analysis for the Kuznets curve.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The central focus of this paper is the eﬀect of economic growth on wage inequal-
ity. The analysis in the paper is based on a simple model with two sectors, rural
and urban, in which the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition holds.
The simplicity of the model allows inequality to be analyzed very easily in terms
o fm o v e m e n t si nL o r e n zc u r v e s . C o m p a r e dt om u c he x i s t i n gw o r k ,t h i si sa
more general approach, because the ￿ndings are not tied to speci￿c summary
measures of inequality.
Through the use of Lorenz curves, the paper derives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for unambiguous changes in wage inequality to occur in the Harris-
Todaro model. It turns out that these conditions have an interesting and useful
property. They depend upon just two variables, the urban unemployment rate
and the number of unemployed. I use this ￿nding to examine the distributional
consequences of various kinds of economic development, and of some of the policy
interventions frequently suggested in the literature.1 Since the simple Harris-
Todaro model is a special case of more general ones, the paper oﬀers some insight
into what kind of results can be expected from more complex models of dual
economies. The analysis allows us to distinguish between cases where general
results may be possible, and cases where theoretical models are likely to yield
ambiguous results, because the old and new Lorenz curves intersect.
Perhaps more importantly, I draw attention to some mechanisms associated
with growth and inequality that may be worthy of further attention. The model
is based upon a rural agricultural sector, and an urban sector that produces
goods and services (the ￿modern￿ sector). In the simplest form of the model,
capital accumulation and technical progress in agriculture are found to reduce
wage inequality unambiguously. The reason is not simply that growth in agricul-
ture reduces the wage gap between urban and rural workers, because there is also
a reinforcing general equilibrium eﬀect. In the long-run migration equilibrium,
an improvement in the prospects of agriculture lowers the urban unemployment
rate and the overall number of unemployed. Therefore, agricultural productiv-
ity growth lowers inequality not only between those in work in the two sectors,
but also between the employed and unemployed. The paper shows how these
eﬀects combine to yield an inwards shift of the entire Lorenz curve, which is an
unusually strong result.
The second main ￿nding is that the eﬀects on inequality of economic de-
velopment in the urban (modern) sector are often ambiguous, even in a very
1The conditions I derive have also been used for this purpose in work by Fields (2001),
w h i c hb u i l d so na ne a r l i e rd r a f to ft h i sp a p e r .
2basic model. Again the intuition is relatively simple, and familiar from the well-
known Todaro paradox. Given capital accumulation or technical progress in the
modern sector, there is a rise in the demand for labour by that sector at any
given wage. The change in prospects in the urban area creates migration, po-
tentially increasing the number of unemployed and hence wage inequality. Since
this mechanism is also likely to be at work in more general models, the analysis
indicates that few general results are likely concerning the distributional eﬀects
of productivity growth in non-agriculture.
These ￿ndings demonstrate the potential relevance of dual economy models
when investigating growth and inequality. The case is further supported by the
recent empirical work of Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998). They use average
labour productivity in agriculture relative to that in non-agriculture as a proxy
for labour market imperfections, and ￿nd that this variable can explain some of
the variation across countries in the distribution of income. This suggests that
the intersectoral wage gap potentially has a sizeable eﬀect on aggregate inequal-
ity, and reinforces the case for studying inequality within two sector models.
In particular, it seems useful to study a model in which the intersectoral
wage gap is determined endogenously. In this paper that is achieved by making
use of the long-run migration equilibrium condition introduced by Todaro (1969)
and Harris and Todaro (1970). It is perhaps surprising that the distributional
implications of economic growth within the Harris-Todaro framework have re-
ceived so little attention, especially given that Kuznets (1955) saw the process
of rural-urban migration as being at the heart of changes in the distribution of
income for less developed countries.
In his groundbreaking paper, Kuznets argued that, as a result of migration,
inequality is likely ￿rst to rise with the level of development, and then fall. This
is the famous inverse-U hypothesis, or Kuznets curve. More recent analyses
of migration and inequality argue that this kind of general conclusion is rarely
possible. It was pointed out by Fields (1979, 1980) that when migration takes
place in a simple two sector model without unemployment, the new Lorenz curve
crosses the old one. The current paper can be seen as generalizing and extending
his analysis, to incorporate a migration equilibrium condition and the possibility
of sustained urban unemployment.
This has rarely been done in existing research. Kanbur and McIntosh (1988)
argue that the Harris-Todaro model can generate a Kuznets curve, but it is
not clear that their brief analysis allows for a variable urban unemployment
rate. If the migration equilibrium is to be maintained with a ￿xed urban wage,
their analysis will hence be restricted to cases where the agricultural wage is
3constant. More recently, Rauch (1993) has established some suﬃcient conditions
for a Kuznets curve to exist in a two sector model, but only when using the log
variance of income as a measure of inequality.2
Although my approach is arguably more general, some limitations should be
acknowledged at the outset. The analysis rests squarely on the Harris-Todaro
framework and, as with most stylized models, this framework is not without its
critics. My response is that the Harris-Todaro model continues to be regarded as
a powerful explanation of rural-urban migration despite urban unemployment,
and has been in￿uential within both development economics and the regional
science literature.3 Although it undoubtedly abstracts from many important as-
pects of reality, the model can still contribute to a more complete understanding
of long-run distributional outcomes.
A more important criticism is that the analysis in the paper compares long-
run steady states in which the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition
is assumed to hold, and the wage in the urban sector is treated as exogenously
given. The ￿rst assumption may be controversial given the empirical literature
on the ￿wage curve￿, which tends to imply that the Harris-Todaro relation does
not hold in the short to medium run (Blanch￿ower and Oswald 1995, Hoddinott
1996, Kingdon and Knight 1998). The second assumption is unsatisfactory from
a theoretical point of view. A more complete account of long-run inequality
would allow the urban wage to be determined endogenously, through eﬃciency
wage arguments for example. This has rarely been done, and the approach
taken in this paper at least allows the intersectoral wage diﬀerential to vary
endogenously, rather than holding it ￿xed as in much previous work.
One strength of this approach is that, by allowing the wage diﬀerential to
vary, the paper draws attention to general equilibrium eﬀects that will also ap-
pear in more general models. Furthermore, the paper is unusual in distinguishing
carefully between the consequences of diﬀerent types of economic growth. This
may ultimately be more informative, and more useful to policy-makers, than
emphasizing an aggregate reduced-form relationship such as the Kuznets curve.
Kanbur (2000) has recently argued that the Kuznets curve has become some-
thing of a straitjacket in this ￿eld. Studying the distributional consequences of
diﬀerent forms of growth may be one way in which the literature on growth and
distribution could usefully move forward.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 uses the
2A few other papers analyse distributional issues in the context of social welfare, the appro-
priate shadow wage or foreign capital in￿ows. See Chakravarty and Dutta (1990) and Gupta
(1988, 1994).
3On this latter point, see Allen (2001) and Ingene (2001).
4Lorenz curve to derive suﬃcient conditions for unambiguous changes in wage
inequality. Section 3 puts these conditions to work, in exploring the eﬀects on
wage inequality of capital accumulation and technical progress in agriculture
and non-agriculture. The remainder of the analysis examines the distributional
implications of various policies (section 4) and the extent to which more gen-
eral assumptions will modify the results (section 5). Section 6 provides further
discussion, with a particular focus on the implications for the Kuznets curve.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Movements in Lorenz curves
This section derives the conditions under which the Lorenz curve will shift in-
wards or outwards along its entire length, within a simple version of the Harris-
Todaro model. The use of Lorenz curves ensures that the conclusions are not
tied to speci￿c inequality measures. The potential strengths of such an approach
were demonstrated by Bourguignon (1990) using a more complicated model than
the one considered here.
The framework in the present paper is standard. Risk-neutral individuals
decide between working in rural agriculture, where they receive a wage wa,o r
looking for work in urban areas. In the urban areas, they will either be employed
for a wage (wm) ￿xed above the market clearing level, or unemployed with zero
income. All those looking for work in urban areas have an equal likelihood of
￿nding work in each period, so that individuals are employed with probability
(1 − u) and unemployed with probability u,w h e r eu is the unemployment rate
in the urban sector (the proportion of the urban labour force who are unem-
ployed). I also adopt the standard simpli￿cation that the price of agricultural
goods relative to non-agricultural goods is exogenously ￿xed, as in a small open
economy in which all goods are traded.4 Without loss of generality, units for
output are chosen so that the relative price is equal to one.
Workers migrate between sectors unless the expected wage in the urban
sector is equal to the rural wage. Hence in equilibrium, we have the Harris-
Todaro migration equilibrium condition:
wa =( 1 − u)wm (1)
The total number of workers is normalized to one. The proportions employed
in agriculture, employed in the urban (modern) sector, and unemployed are given
by La, Lm and Lu respectively. For future use, it is helpful to note that
4Bourguignon (1990) considers a model where the internal terms of trade are endogenous.
5Lu = u(1 − La)( 2 )
Lm =( 1 − u)(1 − La)( 3 )
Mean wage income ￿ is given by
￿ = waLa + wmLm = wa (4)
where the second equality follows from use of (1)a n d( 3 ) .
We are now in a position to analyze the Lorenz curve. For now, assume
that individuals only receive income from wages. The Lorenz curve will clearly
be piecewise linear with two kinks, as in ￿gure 1. Segment one is based on
the income (zero) of the unemployed, segment two on the income of those in
agriculture, and segment three on the income of those working in the modern
sector.
It is easy to show that the slope of each segment of a Lorenz curve is given
by the ratio of that group￿s wage to the average wage of the whole population.5
In this case, the slope of each segment will be given by the ratio of that group￿s
wage to the agricultural wage, by (4) above. In particular, note that whatever
the distribution of income, the slope of segment two is ￿xed at unity, given that
the wage in agriculture is equal to the mean wage of the whole population.
We can now derive two necessary conditions for an unambiguous increase
in wage inequality, represented by an outward shift of the entire Lorenz curve.
First, the number of unemployed should increase or stay the same. Secondly,
the slope of segment three should also increase or stay the same. If we use a
subscript to discriminate between two time periods, so that for instance wat
means the rural wage at period t, the two conditions can be written as:
Lu2 ≥ Lu1 (5)
wm2
wa2
≥
wm1
wa1
(6)
Furthermore, since the slope of segment two is ￿xed at unity, it should be
clear from ￿gure 1 that if both these inequalities hold and one holds strictly,
that will be suﬃcient for an unambiguous increase in inequality.
Using (1) ,t h ei n e q u a l i t y( 6 )c a nb es i m p l i ￿ed as follows:
1
1 − u2
≥
1
1 − u1
or u2 ≥ u1
5Bourguignon (1990) provides a formal derivation of this result.
6Hence necessary and suﬃcient conditions for an unambiguous rise in wage
inequality in the Harris-Todaro model are very simply stated. If one of the
following statements holds, inequality will rise:
(U1) the urban unemployment rate rises, and the number of unemployed
goes up.
(U2) the urban unemployment rate is constant, and the number of unem-
ployed rises. Modern sector employment rises, and agricultural employment
falls.
(U3) the urban unemployment rate rises, and the number of unemployed is
constant. Modern sector employment falls, and agricultural employment rises.
As y m m e t r i ca n a l y s i sc a nb eu s e dt od e r i v et h en e c e s s a r ya n ds u ﬃcient
conditions for the Lorenz curve to shift inwards, and hence for inequality to be
unambigously reduced. Inequality falls if one of the following statements holds:
(D1) the urban unemployment rate falls and the number of unemployed goes
down.
(D2) the urban unemployment rate is constant, and the number of unem-
ployed goes down. Modern sector employment falls, and agricultural employ-
ment rises.
(D3) the urban unemployment rate falls, and the number of unemployed is
constant. Modern sector employment rises, and agricultural employment falls.
These conditions indicate that, to know what happens to inequality in the
Harris-Todaro model, all we need to know is the urban unemployment rate and
the number of unemployed. Together, these two variables capture all the infor-
mation in the Lorenz curve. The conditions also indicate that only knowing the
direction of change of employment in the modern sector or agriculture does not
allow us to draw conclusions about inequality. In particular, urbanization, which
corresponds to a fall in agricultural employment, can potentially be associated
w i t har i s eo rf a l li nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y .
The main conclusion, that only the urban unemployment rate and the num-
ber of unemployed matter, can be seen more explicitly if we consider a Lorenz-
consistent summary measure of inequality. For instance, in this model, the Gini
coeﬃcient is given by:
G =
LaLm(wm − wa)+waLu
wa
a sd e r i v e di nG u p t a( 1988). However, it does not seem to have been previ-
ously noted that this expression can be simpli￿ed further using equations (1),
(2) and (3). The following are all valid expressions for the Gini coeﬃcient:
G = u(1 − L2
a)( 7 )
7= Lu(1 + La)( 8 )
= Lu(2 −
Lu
u
)( 9 )
Diﬀerentiation of (9) con￿rms that the Gini coeﬃcient is increasing in Lu
and u, in line with the conditions derived above. It should be emphasized at
this point that expressions like (7) will not be a good indicator of inequality in
empirical applications, because they ignore inequality within the rural sector,
and under-estimate that within the urban sector. Unsurprisingly, back-of-the-
envelope calculations show that the expressions above do not yield Gini coeﬃ-
cients of the magnitude actually observed. This does not preclude them from
being useful in the theoretical analysis of inequality, social welfare, and shadow
wages.
The results also indicate a potential testable implication of the Harris-Todaro
model. In the cross-country data, summary measures of inequality should be
associated more strongly with the urban unemployment rate than one would
expect in a model without dualism. This is because in the Harris-Todaro model
the degree of inequality between urban workers and rural workers is an increas-
ing function of the urban unemployment rate, as well as inequality between the
employed and unemployed. In principle, leaving aside data availability consider-
ations, the urban unemployment rate could be a better indicator of dualism than
the indicator of relative average products of labour used by Bourguignon and
Morrisson (1998). This is because the urban unemployment rate is connected
to the relative marginal products of urban and rural workers. It may therefore
capture the extent of dualism and wage inequality better than a variable based
on relative average products.
In other respects, the approach outlined here strongly supports the argu-
ments of Bourguignon and Morrisson. They suggest that the observed eﬀect
of dualism on inequality could re￿ect more than simply a diﬀerence in average
incomes between the rural and urban populations. In the model analyzed here,
there is no diﬀerential between the average income of the rural and urban pop-
ulations, if we include the unemployed in the urban population. Dualism still
gives rise to inequality, because it is associated with greater inequality between
t h ee m p l o y e da n du n e m p l o y e d ,a n db e t w e e nt h o s ei nw o r ki nu r b a na n di nr u r a l
areas.
3 Economic growth and distribution
The results in this section are one of the main contributions of the paper. Using
the conditions derived above, I analyze the eﬀects of various kinds of growth on
8wage inequality. The section considers productivity gains and capital accumu-
lation in agriculture, and in the modern sector. One of the main ￿ndings is that
agricultural development has an unambiguously bene￿cial impact on wage in-
equality. In contrast, the eﬀect of development in the modern sector is typically
ambiguous.
As in earlier work on the Harris-Todaro model, I distinguish between two
cases: a model with sector-speci￿c capital, and one with capital that is mobile
between the urban and rural sectors. For simplicity, I will assume that capital
income is distributed so that it raises all incomes in the same proportion. This
simple trick means that inequality in wage income corresponds to inequality in
all income. Alternatively, one can see the following analysis as limited to the
distribution of wage income.
3.1 The model with sector-speci￿cc a p i t a l
It turns out that it is relatively straightforward to use (U1)-(U3) and (D1)-
(D3) to study wage inequality in the Harris-Todaro model with sector-speci￿c
capital. We can base the analysis around a simple and now well-known diagram
introduced by Corden (1974) and Corden and Findlay (1975), shown as ￿gure
2.
MM￿ is the marginal product curve in modern sector, AA￿ that in agriculture.
The ingenious feature of the diagram is the rectangular hyperbola qq￿. The in-
tersection of qq￿ with AA￿ represents an equilibrium in which the Harris-Todaro
equilibrium condition (1)i ss a t i s ￿ed. To see this, note that the area under the
curve at this intersection is equal to wa(1 − La) or alternatively wa(Lm + Lu).
Given that the qq￿ curve is a rectangular hyperbola, this area must be equal to
the area under the curve at point H, namely wmLm.I t i s e a s y t o s h o w t h a t
equality between the area wmLm and the area wa (Lm + Lu)i m p l i e st h a tt h e
Harris-Todaro equilibrium condition (1)i ss a t i s ￿ed at the intersection of qq￿
with AA￿.
This diagram is now used to analyze the eﬀects of growth on wage inequality.
Assume that the urban wage rate is ￿xed, and that returns in agriculture are
diminishing, so that AA￿ slopes downwards. Capital accumulation or technical
progress in agriculture will shift AA￿ upwards and raise the agricultural wage.
By (1), the urban unemployment rate must be lower in the new equilibrium.
Since modern sector employment is unchanged, while agricultural employment
goes up, the number of unemployed must fall. With a fall in both the urban
unemployment rate and the number of unemployed, it is clear that growth in
the agricultural sector leads to an unambiguous reduction in wage inequality.
9Now consider the case of capital accumulation or technical progress in the
modern sector. The demand for labour at any given wage increases. MM￿ and qq￿
shift upwards, so modern sector employment goes up, agricultural employment
goes down, and the agricultural wage rises. In the new equilibrium the urban
unemployment rate will be lower, again by (1) .T h i sm e a n st h a tg r o w t hi nt h e
modern sector cannot generate an unambiguous rise in wage inequality, given
diminishing returns in agriculture. What happens to inequality will depend on
whether the number of unemployed goes up or down. If it does not rise, there
will be an unambiguous reduction in wage inequality. Otherwise, the old and
new Lorenz curves will intersect.
I now consider the case where returns to labour in agriculture are constant,
so that the AA￿ line is horizontal. Capital accumulation or technical progress
in agriculture shifts the AA￿ line upwards. With unchanged labour demand
in the modern sector, employment in the modern sector stays the same, while
agricultural employment and wages go up. The number of unemployed must be
lower in the new equilibrium, as is the urban unemployment rate. There is again
an unambiguous reduction in inequality.
Capital accumulation or technical progress in the modern sector shifts the
MM￿ and qq￿ curves upwards. With both the agricultural and modern sector
wages constant, the urban unemployment rate must be constant. Modern sector
employment will be higher in the new equilibrium, and agricultural employment
lower. For the urban unemployment rate to remain constant, the number of
unemployed must rise. Using condition (U2) above, this is suﬃcient for an
unambiguous rise in wage inequality.
3.2 The model with mobile capital
I now turn to the case of the Harris-Todaro model with mobile capital, drawing
heavily on the classic analysis of Corden and Findlay (1975). They point out that
when capital is mobile between sectors, an increase in the aggregate capital stock
or a change in the size of the labour force will leave the urban unemployment
rate unchanged. Thus, when factor endowments vary, it is only movements in
the number of unemployed that determine the outcome for wage inequality.
I follow Corden and Findlay in assuming that the modern sector is relatively
capital intensive. With this assumption, Corden and Findlay show that capital
accumulation will increase the number of unemployed, even though the urban
unemployment rate remains constant. By condition (U2) above, this yields a rise
in inequality. Modern sector employment must also be higher in the new equi-
librium, otherwise the urban unemployment rate would not be constant. Hence
10capital accumulation is associated with both greater inequality and increased
urbanization.
A sp o i n t e do u tb yC o r d e na n dF i n d l a y ,t h ee ﬀects of capital accumulation
may be modi￿ed by land scarcity. This is considered in more detail by Yabuuchi
(1998). He concludes that, under certain conditions, capital accumulation may
decrease the number of unemployed. Hence in a more general model, it may well
be diﬃcult to draw ￿rm conclusions about the eﬀect of capital accumulation on
inequality.
In the simpler model without land, the eﬀects of technical progress in either
agriculture or modern sector can also be analyzed. Now, the urban unemploy-
ment rate may vary. Corden and Findlay show that Hicks-neutral technical
progress in agriculture lowers the urban unemployment rate and the number of
unemployed. Using condition (D1)a b o v e ,t h i si ss u ﬃcient for an unambigu-
ous reduction in wage inequality. They also show that Hicks-neutral technical
progress in the modern sector has the reverse eﬀect: it raises the urban un-
employment rate and the number of unemployed.6 Inequality must rise. Since
agricultural employment must fall, economic growth is again associated with
urbanization and greater inequality.
3.3 Summary of the results
The main results of this section can be summarised as follows. In all the cases
considered, technical progress in agriculture leads to an inwards shift of the entire
Lorenz curve. The reason is not simply a reduction in the intersectoral wage
gap between those in work in urban and rural areas. There is also a reinforcing
general equilibrium eﬀect. In the new migration equilibrium, growth in the
agricultural sector implies that the extent of inequality between the employed
a n du n e m p l o y e di sl o w e r .
The eﬀect of technical progress in the modern sector is more complex, and
depends on the underlying assumptions. There will be an unambiguous rise in
wage inequality if capital is mobile across sectors, or if capital is sector-speci￿c
and returns in agriculture are constant. With sector-speci￿c capital and dimin-
ishing returns in agriculture, the urban unemployment rate falls. The Lorenz
curve will shift inwards, or intersect with the old one, depending on whether
the number of unemployed goes up or down. The reason for this complexity is
again general equilibrium eﬀects. An improvement in prospects in the urban
sector encourages migration from agriculture, and this aﬀects the extent of un-
6Beladi and Naqvi (1988) show that the conclusions about the rate of unemployment apply
to any kind of technical progress in manufacturing or agriculture, not just Hicks-neutral.
11employment, and hence the extent of inequality between the employed and the
unemployed.
Other interesting results concern urbanization, de￿ned here as a fall in rural
employment. In most of the cases considered, falling rural employment will occur
a tt h es a m et i m ea su n a m b i g u o u si n c r e a s e si nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y .T h ee x c e p t i o ni s
urbanization driven by capital accumulation or technical progress in the modern
sector, in the case with diminishing returns to agricultural labour and sector-
speci￿c capital. Then reductions in wage inequality may occur at the same time
as urbanization.
4 Distributional eﬀects of policy intervention
The introduction of the dual economy model of Harris and Todaro (1970) was
soon followed by analysis of various policy interventions. One omission in this
literature is that it typically concentrates on aggregate output, and ignores dis-
tributional eﬀects. This section will show that policy changes which fall short of
achieving the ￿r s t - b e s tm a yi nf a c tl e a dt oar i s ei nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y ,s u g g e s t i n g
an ambiguous eﬀect of the policy intervention on social welfare. For simplicity,
I focus on the case of sector-speci￿cc a p i t a l .
The ￿rst observation is that inequality in the model arises only because of
unemployment, which in turn arises because of the exogenously ￿xed wage in
the urban sector. One reason the urban wage may be ￿xed is through minimum
wage legislation, under the control of the government. It is therefore interesting
to consider the distributional impact of lowering this wage, and that task will
be achieved by section 4.1 below.
The urban wage may, however, be rigid downwards for reasons other than
minimum wage legislation. With this in mind, various authors have considered
a range of policy interventions that take the wage received by urban workers as
given. Policies that can potentially eliminate unemployment altogether include
a modern sector wage subsidy (Srinivasan and Bhagwati 1975), an agricultural
wage subsidy (Corden and Findlay 1975) and a uniform wage subsidy (Bhagwati
and Srinivasan 1974, Corden 1974, Basu 1980). In practice, such policies are
likely to be diﬃcult to implement. The wage subsidy may lie below the level
needed to achieve the ￿rst-best outcome, and again it is interesting to explore
the distributional impact of such a policy. That will be the task of section 4.2
below.
124.1 Inequality and minimum wages
Given that the motivation for introducing a minimum wage is often to reduce
inequality, it is interesting to note that the origin of inequality in simple versions
of the Harris-Todaro model is precisely the setting of a minimum wage above the
market clearing level. In this very simple framework, abandoning the minimum
wage will lead to an unambiguous reduction in wage inequality.7 It might be
thought that lowering the minimum wage, but keeping it above the market-
clearing level, would have the same eﬀect. In this section, I show that this is
usually true, but not always. The reason is that a reduction in the minimum
wage can actually increase the number of unemployed in the sector covered by
the minimum wage legislation, as previously demonstrated by Feldman (1989)
and Fields (1997).
It can be shown that a reduction in the minimum wage always lowers the
urban unemployment rate. In contrast, the eﬀect on the number of unemployed
is ambiguous, because the reduced risk of unemployment may lead to migration
from rural areas. The urban sector may increase in size suﬃciently that the net
eﬀe c ti sar i s ei nt h en u m b e ro fp e o p l eu n e m p l o y e d .T os e et h i sm o r ef o r m a l l y ,
denote the constant wage elasticities of labour demand in the modern sector and
agriculture by η and † respectively (both de￿ned to be positive). Feldman (1989)
shows that the change in unemployment, in response to a percentage change in
the minimum wage of ￿ wm,i sg i v e nb y :
dLu =
·
La†(1 − η)
1 + †(La/(1 − La))
+ Lmη
¸
￿ wm
It is clear that if η > 1, the term in square brackets could possibly be
negative, in which case a reduction in the minimum wage will lead to an increase
in the number of unemployed, if the minimum wage remains above the market-
clearing level. The next question is the likelihood of this outcome in practice.
Using (3) and simplifying, it can be shown that the critical value of η is given
by
η∗ =
†
u† +
³
1 − 1
La
´
(1 − u)
(10)
Only if the wage elasticity of labour demand in modern sector is at or below
η∗ will a reduction in the minimum wage lead to an unambiguous reduction
in wage inequality. Diﬀerentiation of (10) reveals that η∗ is decreasing in †,
7Note that the introduction of a minimum wage may have very diﬀerent eﬀects in a more
complicated model. For instance Rodrik (1996) demonstrates that the introduction of a mini-
mum wage may have bene￿cial eﬀects on output in a model with multiple equilibria, and that
the minimum wage need not bind in equilibrium.
13agricultural employment (La) and the unemployment rate (u). Even choosing
high values for these parameters, a few simple calculations indicate that η > η∗ is
unlikely. For instance, setting La =0 .8, u =0 .3, and † =2m e a n st h a tη∗ is 4.7.
This means that the threshold is unlikely to be reached in practice: the elasticity
of labour demand in the urban sector is often assumed to be less than one, as in
Ag· enor (1996, fn. 21). This suggests that for most plausible parameter values,
any reduction in the minimum wage will lead to an unambiguous reduction in
wage inequality in this simple model. In practice, however, it is essential to
emphasize that this eﬀect could be more than oﬀset by a host of others.
4.2 A uniform wage subsidy
In the ￿rst best allocation there is no unemployment, and the marginal product
of labour in the modern sector is equal to that in agriculture. In an elegant paper
Basu (1980) shows that any uniform wage subsidy S g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oa
threshold S∗ (to be de￿ned below) will achieve the ￿rst-best allocation. Basu
also shows that any smaller subsidy S ∈ (0,S∗) will raise social welfare, where
social welfare is measured by total output. This section extends his work by
introducing distributional considerations into the welfare analysis.
More speci￿cally, it will be shown that a small uniform subsidy S ∈ (0,S∗)
has an ambiguous eﬀect on the distribution of income. Output in each sector is
a function of labour input,
Xa = fa(La); f0
a > 0,f00
a < 0
Xm = fm(Lm); f0
m > 0,f00
m < 0
where as before a denotes agriculture and m denotes the modern sector.
Labour is the only variable input, consistent with the presence of ￿xed sector-
speci￿cc a p i t a ls t o c k s .
If labour is paid its marginal product, and there is a uniform subsidy S,t h e n
we have
f0
m(Lm)=wm − S (11)
f0
a(La)+S =( 1 − u)wm (12)
Note that the optimal subsidy is S∗ = wm − f0
m(L∗
m)w h e r eL∗
m is the level
of modern sector employment in the ￿r s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n .T h en u m b e ro fu n e m -
ployed is given by
Lu = 1 − Lm − La
14The eﬀect of the subsidy is given by
dLu
dS
= −
dLm
dS
−
dLa
dS
Using results in Basu (1980, p. 194) and equation (11), it can be shown that
dLu
dS
=
f0
m − f0
a +( 1 − La)(f00
m + f00
a)
f00
m [(1 − La)f00
a − f0
a − S]
(13)
Since f0
m >f 0
a outside the ￿rst best allocation, the sign of (13) is ambiguous,
and so a uniform wage subsidy below S∗ will have an ambiguous eﬀect on the
number of unemployed and hence on wage inequality. The possibility is open
that a uniform subsidy below the optimal level may do more harm than good,
although the generality of this result is not clear.
5S o m e e x t e n s i o n s
I now consider the eﬀects of extending the simple model studied above. First, I
consider an unemployment bene￿t funded by an income tax on urban workers.
Secondly, the paper considers how the analysis will be modi￿ed by a non-zero
wage for the unemployed, re￿ecting the possibility that they could ￿nd work
in an informal sector. Unambiguous changes in wage inequality are found to be
unlikely in these more general models. This has implications for the generality
of Kuznets curve results, a point that will be discussed at greater length in the
next section.
5.1 Unemployment bene￿ts
So far, it has been assumed that the unemployed have no income. I now consider
extending the model to incorporate unemployment bene￿t. The bene￿t is funded
by a proportional income tax on urban employees, at a ￿xed rate 0 <t<1.
The underlying assumption is that it may be easier to tax the incomes of urban
workers than the incomes of those working in agriculture.
With the tax in place, the income of each urban worker is (1 − t)wm.I ft h e
entire tax revenue is used to fund the unemployment bene￿t, the income of each
unemployed person will be wu =
³
1−u
u
´
twm. Since the tax just redistributes
income within urban areas, it does not aﬀect the expected income of urban living.
Hence the allocation of workers between rural and urban areas is independent
of the tax under the assumption of risk neutrality, and in the absence of labour
supply eﬀects of the tax.
15This can be demonstrated very simply: the new Harris-Todaro equilibrium
condition
uwu +( 1 − u)(1 − t)wm = wa
simpli￿es to the condition in the absence of a tax,
(1 − u)wm = wa
con￿rming that the tax does not aﬀect the intersectoral allocation of workers.
Similarly, average income remains wa. To ensure that some workers are employed
in each sector, I assume that
wu <w a <w m
w h i c hc a nb ew r i t t e na s :
µ
1 − u
u
¶
twm <w a < (1 − t)wm
for which a necessary condition is t<u .
The main diﬀerence to the earlier analysis is now that the ￿rst segment of the
Lorenz curve slopes upwards, with slope t/u. Hence this segment gets steeper
as the unemployment rate falls, and this makes the necessary and suﬃcient con-
ditions for an unambiguous change in (after-tax) wage inequality much more
complicated. The most interesting ￿nding is that a rise in the number of un-
employed is potentially compatible with a decrease in wage inequality, provided
the urban unemployment rate falls suﬃciently far.
Obviously a rise in the tax rate will lead to an unambiguous reduction in wage
inequality, because it reduces inequality between the employed and unemployed,
a n da f t e r - t a xi n e q u a l i t yb e t w e e nu r b a na n dr u r a lw o r k e r s .T h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient
in this model is given by
G = Lu
µ
1 −
t
u
¶µ
2 −
Lu
u
¶
which is lower than in (9) unless the tax rate is zero, as required.
5.2 The informal sector
This section considers an alternative and more general assumption about the in-
come of the unemployed. I assume that those not employed in the modern sector
can ￿nd work in the informal sector, and hence earn a wage wu <w a <w m.
Once again, mean income will be given by wa in the Harris-Todaro equilibrium.
16The introduction of an informal sector makes the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions rather more complicated. Perhaps the main point to note is that an
unambiguous reduction in inequality now has an additional necessary condition:
wu2
wa2
≥
wu1
wa1
In other words, if the Lorenz curve is to shift inwards, the ratio of the
informal sector wage to the agricultural wage must increase. If we assume that
the agricultural wage rises with the level of development, as seems likely, then
an unambiguous reduction in wage inequality is not possible unless the informal
sector wage is also increasing.
That the conditions for changes in inequality are more complicated can also
be seen from the Gini coeﬃcient. It is not diﬃcult to show that the Gini coeﬃ-
cient in this model is given by:
G = Lu
µ
2 −
Lu
u
¶µ
1 −
wu
wa
¶
This expression makes clear that knowing what happens to the number of
unemployed and the urban unemployment rate is no longer suﬃcient to tell
us what happens to wage inequality. Now, we need to know something about
the evolution of the agricultural and informal sector wages as well. A natural
assumption is that wu is ￿xed, perhaps because the production technology in
the informal sector has constant returns to labour and does not bene￿tf r o m
technical progress. If wu is ￿x e dt h e nas u ﬃcient condition for inequality as
measured by the Gini coeﬃcient to rise is that at least one of wa, Lu and u
increase and none decrease.
6 Discussion
This section provides some further discussion. The aim is to put the ￿ndings
of the paper in context, and highlight the various strengths and weaknesses of
the present approach. I also consider the implications of the analysis for the
Kuznets curve hypothesis.
One of the main contributions of the paper has been to follow Fields (1979,
1980) in demonstrating that general statements about wage inequality are dif-
￿cult to make even in very simple models. Usually, the movement to a new
long-run equilibrium is associated with a new Lorenz curve that intersects the
old one. This ambiguity is present even though the paper abstracts from many
important aspects of the real world, including remittances, migration decisions
made at the household level rather than by individuals, and heterogeneity within
17the urban and rural sectors. Stark (1991) has drawn attention to the impor-
tance of such considerations. Lipton (1980) pointed out that the introduction
of heterogeneity can alter the relation between migration and changes in wage
inequality.
Lipton also suggested that ￿most neoclassical economists would expect vol-
untary population movements to reduce both ineﬃciency and inequality￿ (Lip-
ton 1980, p. 1). As we have seen, Lipton￿s neoclassical economist would be
wrong if there are imperfections in the urban labour market, such as an exoge-
nously ￿xed wage. Economic development in the urban sector, or a removal of
barriers to migration, can generate population movements that sometimes lead
to a greater number of unemployed in urban areas. If this is the case, then
at best the new Lorenz curve will intersect with the old one, and at worst lie
entirely outside it. This suggests that migration policy will sometimes involve
an eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ.
Analysis of the entire Lorenz curve can also shed light on other hypotheses,
notably the Kuznets curve. In principle, one could distinguish between two
versions of the Kuznets hypothesis. A model yielding a ￿measure-independent￿
Kuznets curve would be one in which all Lorenz-consistent inequality measures
indicated a worsening of distribution with economic growth, followed by an
improvement. This would require the Lorenz curves to shift in and out without
ever intersecting, and as we have seen, this is unlikely in all but the simplest
models. Hence more usually the Kuznets curve will be ￿measure-speci￿c￿. The
pattern of rising and then falling inequality will only be observed, if at all, for a
subset of Lorenz-consistent summary measures.8
The framework used in this paper indicates that the Kuznets curve is unlikely
to be a general outcome of two sector models in which wage inequality is driven
by sectoral productivity growth and migration. The eﬀects of development on
wage inequality were found to depend on the source of growth, agriculture or
the modern sector. It is true that productivity growth in the agricultural sector
unambiguously reduces wage inequality, but only if the unemployed receive no
income.
As noted previously, a full understanding of these questions would require a
richer model. Previous analyses of the Kuznets curve in two sector models have
8O n ew e l l - k n o w nr e s u l ti nt h i sa r e ai st h e￿nding of Anand and Kanbur (1993) that, for the
decomposable measures of inequality they consider, the distribution of income must worsen at
the start of development. Although this result seems quite powerful, it is less strong than it
￿rst appears. Anand and Kanbur de￿ne the start of the process as an increase in the share of
population in the modern sector from zero. Arguably, the initial state of the Kuznets migration
process should be seen as a steady state with at least some modern sector employment, even
in the very poorest countries.
18o f t e na s s u m e da￿xed wage diﬀerential between the urban and rural areas, where
t h es o u r c eo ft h ed i ﬀerential is left unexplained. In this paper, I have allowed the
diﬀerential to be determined endogenously through a long-run migration equi-
librium condition, but have assumed that the urban wage is exogenously ￿xed.
In analysing a long-run phenomenon such as the Kuznets curve, it would obvi-
ously be preferable for the urban wage to be determined endogenously. Analysis
along these lines has been carried out by MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) using
a more complex model. They show how the generation of jobs in the urban sec-
tor has implications for inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient. Again,
though, it seems likely that the Lorenz curves will sometimes intersect, ruling
out unambiguous statements about movements in wage inequality.
7 Conclusions
The starting point for this paper is the observation that, although the Harris-
Todaro model has been much studied, its implications for inequality have been
examined only rarely. The paper remedies this omission, using a simpli￿ed
version of the model to investigate the eﬀe c t so fg r o w t ho nw a g ei n e q u a l i t y .
Compared to many earlier studies of inequality in dual economies, a considerable
strength of the paper is the use of Lorenz curves rather than summary measures.
Hence the analysis in this paper is based on less restrictive assumptions, and
allows a more reliable assessment of where unambiguous conclusions may be
possible, and where theoretical ambiguity is inevitable. The paper derives a
set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for unambiguous movements in wage
inequality, based on just two variables, the urban unemployment rate and the
number of unemployed.
These conditions are then used to study the consequences of economic growth.
In the simplest version of the model, the most interesting result is that growth
in the agricultural sector leads to an unambiguous reduction in wage inequality.
The eﬀects of growth in the non-agricultural sector are less clear-cut. Despite
this ambiguity, the analysis remains useful, in that it draws attention to some of
the general equilibrium eﬀects that are associated with productivity growth in
two sector models. For example, an improvement in prospects in the urban sec-
tor will often be associated with rural-urban migration, and potentially greater
inequality as a result.
As with previous research in this ￿eld, the paper provides only partial in-
sight into the relationship between growth and wage inequality. Nevertheless, it
is clear that two sector models can make a useful contribution to understand-
19ing these issues. A particular strength of the two sector approach is that one
can easily distinguish between the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of economic growth.
This is likely to be a more productive research strategy than one restricted to
reduced form, Kuznets-type relationships between levels of GDP per capita and
inequality.
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